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Pay Gap and Performance in China
The growing gap between the pay of executives and employees has been
the subject of much media publicity and political attention in recent times.
We analyze the pay gap between executives and employees, focusing on
three components: executive pay premium relative to industry peers;
employee pay premium; and average pay gap at the industry level. We
examine how the executive and employee pay premium components of
the pay gap drive firm performance. On one hand, economic theories of
matching and managerial talent suggest talented executives who generate
relatively better firm performance receive wage premiums, implying a
positive relation between pay gap and performance. On the other hand,
sociological theories suggest that the inequity implied by a larger pay gap
lowers firm performance by adversely affecting employee morale and
productivity. To test these alternative theories, we utilize pay gap data from
China that provides a setting with strong national preferences towards
social equity but also with a scarcity of experienced managers and
abundance of low-cost labour. Our results strongly support the economic
theories—firm performance is largely driven by pay premium for executive
talent. Additional tests using a smaller sample of US firms with pay gap
data are consistent with our primary findings. Our study is likely to be of
interest to politicians, regulators, and company executives responsible for
understanding and evaluating pay gap and executive pay.
Key words: Accounting performance; Employee pay premium; Executive
pay premium; Matching theory; Pay gap.
The performance implications of the increasing gap in the average pay of executives
and employees has been the subject of significant media and political scrutiny in
recent years. International news and business articles suggest politicians and regula-
tors face mounting pressure to curb a widening executive–employee pay gap driven
by growth in executive pay.1 For instance, Section 953(b) of the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 now requires all US public
firms to disclose median employee compensation as well as the CEO total compen-
sation to median employee compensation ratio. The recently released Hutton report
recommends similar disclosures for public firms in Britain. As pay gap is the ratio of
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chief executive pay to average employee pay, the pay gap increases with the wage
premium paid for talented and motivated executives and decreases with the wage
premium paid to employees. Performance, however, depends on the productivity
of executives and employees relative to their pay.
Many populist commentators draw upon sociological theories to argue that a
larger pay gap can adversely affect employee morale because employees believe
they are underpaid and executives are expropriating the wealth created in the firm.
This in turn is believed to lead to a negative relationship between pay gap and firm
performance (e.g., Levine, 1991). The possible adverse effect of pay gap is well
documented in sociological research on equity and relative deprivation theories of
distributive justice. Relative deprivation theory argues that individuals experience
deprivation when they find that they have received fewer rewards than they deserve
compared to rewards received by their reference groups (Martin, 1981; Crosby,
1984; Cowherd and Levine, 1992) and firms should reduce the pay gap in order to
increase cohesiveness and employee productivity (Levine, 1991). Thus, sociological
theories suggest that a smaller pay gap is associated with higher firm performance.
By contrast, on analyzing the issue from an economic perspective, exactly the
opposite relationship between pay gap and performance is predicted. Market forces
and the relative supply and demand of executive and employee talent affect pay gap
via the effect on wage premiums. When talented senior executive leadership is
scarce, pay gap may be driven by wage premiums for executives who can generate
relatively better firm performance (Lazear, 1979; Rosen, 1982; Raff and Summers,
1987; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000). Recent research in account-
ing establishes a positive link between executive pay and current and future perfor-
mance because current pay reflects the persistent ability of the executive2 (Hayes
and Schaefer, 2000; Ederhof, 2010, Banker et al., 2013). If the skill of lower level
employees is not as scarce a resource, they will not receive premium wages. Thus,
when executive talent is in short supply and employee labour is abundant, wage
premiums are likely to be greater for talented executives than for employees,
leading to a higher pay gap and a higher performance. This alternative economic
perspective predicts the pay gap is positively related to performance when talented
executives are scarce but employees are not.3
Matching theory argues that talented managers are sought and recruited by firms
that benefit most from employing them so, in equilibrium, talented executives
receive relatively greater compensation than their peers, and premium wages paid
to talented managers are expected to be more than offset by the executive’s subse-
quent contribution to the creation of firm value (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985;
2 A large literature in accounting and financial economics examines the relation between executive pay
and firm performance. Examples include Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Coughlan and Schmidt
(1985), Murphy (1985), Antle and Smith (1986), Lambert and Larcker (1987), Jensen and Murphy
(1990), Abowd (1990), and Leonard (1990).
3 Related economic theories include matching theory (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000)
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Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Joskow and Rose, 1994; Banker et al.,
2000). In other words, the incremental firm value created by hiring a talented
manager is shared between the firm and the executive. Managerial talent theory
also predicts a positive relation between executive pay and pay gap. Recruiting
and compensation are linked to observable signals about executive talent, and
attracting and retaining talent requires compensation above the industry average.
Unusually high talents and abilities must earn scarcity rents even in the absence of
agency and incentive problems (Rosen, 1982; Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Ke et al.,
1999). Wage premiums result in greater firm performance because greater talent
filters through the entire firm suggesting a positive relation between executive pay
(and therefore the pay gap if workers are not scarce) and firm performance, ceteris
paribus.4 Efficiency wage theory predicts that remunerating employees with above-
average wages relative to peers may increase employee morale, reduce turnover,
and deliver gains in productivity and profitability that exceed the incremental wage
cost (Lazear, 1979; Malcolmson, 1981; Akerlof, 1982; Raff and Summers, 1987).
While pay gap has been subject to much international media attention, the mech-
anisms through which pay gap affects firm performance have received relatively less
attention. There is no prior study that has looked at how the pay gap between exec-
utives and employees affects firm performance through the lens of how talented
executives and employees are paid compared to their peers in their industries.
Whereas much prior academic research has focused on the pay–performance rela-
tion for the CEO or top executive team, our study is different in two ways. First,
we consider the effect of wage premiums for both executive and employee talent
on firm performance. Second, we consider how the relative gap between executive
and employee pay affects firm performance from both economic and sociological
perspectives. Evaluating the contrasting theories from sociology and economics is
an empirical question, and is the main objective of our paper.
China’s economic and social characteristics make it an interesting setting to test
the contrasting predictions. A large available pool of low-cost low-skilled labour
has fuelled China’s rapid growth in the global market for manufacturing low-
value-added goods. AWorld Bank report (2009) indicates the Chinese labour force
comprises a large pool of homogenous unskilled labour with low marginal product
of employees. Marginal contribution from less skilled labour to firm value is rela-
tively low, and instead the strategic challenge for Chinese firms is in identifying
new markets, customers, and products (Lane and Pollner, 2008). At the same time,
a recent report notes that 44% of surveyed Chinese firm executives identified inad-
equate supply of executive talent as the biggest barrier to their global ambitions
(Lane and Pollner, 2008).5 A Forbes Magazine article on Chinese executives notes
4 These economic theories predict a negative relation when a lower pay gap is driven by wage premiums
for scarce skilled employees, but executive talent is not a significant value driver. A famous example is
Henry Ford’s ‘Five Dollar Workday’ strategy (see Raff and Summers, 1987). Efficiency wage theory,
however, is not likely to apply if the labour required is low skill and abundant.
5 For China, see Lane and Pollner (2008); and Kelly HBR China 2010 Talent Competence Survey:
http://www.executivecentre.com/blog/2010/12/chinas-talent-market-faces-competency-shortage/
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companies are finding it ‘… increasingly difficult to recruit and retain talented em-
ployees because the demand for such employees by foreign and domestic firms out-
strips supply’ and ‘these shortages frequently affect bottom lines as companies seek
to retain employees through improved compensation and benefits packages’
(Rapoza, 2011). As a result, growth in firm value is driven more by talented execu-
tives with skills that allow the exploitation of Chinese firms’ comparative advantages
and growth opportunities. This characteristic of the Chinese economy suggests that
a wage premium for talented executives is likely to improve firm performance con-
sistent with economic theories of matching and managerial talent. In other words,
economic conditions in China are also consistent with economic theories that predict
a positive relation between pay gap and performance because executive talent is in
short supply and labour is abundant. In addition, China’s growing global economic
influence makes it an even more relevant setting and the availability of a large sam-
ple of executive and employee wage data makes the study feasible.
Sociological theories of equity and relative deprivation predict a negative relation
between pay gap and firm performance. China’s history of socialism provides a set-
ting where the predicates of sociological theories are likely to hold. For instance,
senior Chinese Communist Party leaders have made reducing income inequality a
top priority with the Chinese president asserting that China needs to build a ‘more
balanced and harmonious society’, consistent with sociological theories that predict
a negative relation between pay gap and performance.6 Chinese companies face
political pressure to minimize the executive–employee pay gap because of the
importance of social equality to the central government (Firth et al., 2006; Chen,
2014; Chen et al., 2014). Chinese bureaucrats are directed to impose constraints
on executive compensation and keep pay gaps in check. Bureaucrats want to avoid
the consequences of falling out of favour with Communist Party officials, consistent
with Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) theory of political pressure.7 In addition, Chinese
bureaucrats want to avoid publicity from the dissatisfaction of low-level employees
with pay inequality that may also reduce employee productivity and firm performance.
Our empirical results strongly support economic theories rather than sociological
theories: firm performance is positively related to lagged pay gap. In order to check
how pay gap affects firm performance, we conduct further analysis based on a
decomposition of the pay gap into executive pay premium, employee pay premium,
and industry pay gap. The empirical results reveal that the wage premium paid to
talented executives drives the positive relation, but there is no evidence that the
pay premium to employees (which reduces the pay gap) improves performance
6 http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=20&art_id=46550&sid=14013054&con_type=1);
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4382714.stm)
7 Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that third parties create political forces that affect public and private
sector executive pay in the US. They state: ‘[f]ueled by the public disclosure of executive pay required
by the SEC, parties such as employees, labor unions, consumer groups, Congress, and the media cre-
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for Chinese firms. Our tests also control for differences in the pay gap and perfor-
mance relation for listed firms that (i) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and/or
(ii) have received foreign investment to examine if ownership structure and firm
objectives have a moderating effect on the relation between pay gap and
performance.8
In additional tests, we examine whether our results are driven by cross-sectional
differences in the degree to which Chinese firms are exposed to foreign market
competition (measured using whether the firm is classified as a manufacturing or
non-manufacturing firm), as well as geographic proximity to shipping ports
(measured using whether the firm is situated in a coastal or inland location). Our
empirical results suggest our main findings are robust across manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industry partitions as well as regional differences in economic
development. We also find that our results are robust to an alternate specification
of pay gap, in which we examine the relation between performance and the devia-
tion from expected pay gap. Finally, a supplemental test using a sample of US firms
reveals similar findings to our main results.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
We first consider economic theories that explain how the relation between pay gap
and performance is affected by wage premiums for executives and employees. To
the extent to which scarce executive or employee talent is a critical driver of firm
value, it is likely to influence relative pay levels and therefore the pay gap. We
decompose firm pay gap into executive pay premium, employee pay premium,
and industry pay gap. We measure firm-level pay premium by comparing firm-level
pay to median industry-level pay. The executive pay premium and employee pay
premium are respectively measured as the mean executive or employee pay for a
firm relative to the median of corresponding mean values measured across all firms
in its industry. The industry pay gap is the ratio of the median average executive pay
and average employee pay.
Executive Talent and Pay Premium
Executive wage premiums arise to attract talented executives who can identify and
exploit opportunities for the firm and create relatively greater value. Empirical stud-
ies in accounting and financial economics provide strong evidence of a positive rela-
tion between executive pay and contemporaneous performance (Coughlan and
Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and more recently, evi-
dence of a positive relation between current executive pay and future performance
(Hayes and Schaefer, 2000; Ederhof, 2010, Banker et al., 2013). Executives with
greater ability command greater compensation and because ability is correlated
8 Prior studies suggest evidence that SOE managers have incentives to focus on performance and the
realization of growth opportunities (Hu and Leung, 2012; Cao et al., 2009).
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over time, compensation is predictive of future performance. Ceteris paribus, a
higher executive pay premium thus implies both a larger pay gap between execu-
tives and higher firm performance.
Economic theories of matching and managerial talent predict a positive relation
between pay premiums for executives and firm performance. Matching theory
argues that effective matches between firms that demand executive talent and exec-
utives with desired abilities occur when there are complementarities between
executive-specific productivity and firm-specific productivity (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000). The mutually selective nature of the executive
labour market implies an ‘assortative matching’ of executive–firm pairs in equilib-
rium (Li and Ueda, 2006; Pan et al., 2010). Executives with superior talent are
assigned to larger firms because greater talent filters through the entire firm and a
larger firm enjoys economies of scale. As such, firms that require executives with
specific or high levels of skills pay above-market wages to attract and retain such
executives, who, in turn, generate greater firm value, resulting in a positive relation
between executive pay and performance.
Managerial talent theory also predicts a positive relation between performance
and executive pay in equilibrium. Managerial talent theory argues that the adverse
selection problem arising from uncertainty about an executive’s ability is addressed
by executive compensation based on observable signals such as an executive’s past
performance (Rosen, 1982). Executives with a better track record of performance
are seen as having greater ability and command greater remuneration. Thus,
managers who are paid relatively more than their peers are likely to be more
talented and hence able to create relatively greater firm value for their firms.9
Ke et al. (1999) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) provide empirical evidence
supporting the managerial talent hypothesis. Ke et al. (1999) find that executives in
public insurance firms earn relatively more than executives in private insurance firms,
suggesting that public firms that are on average larger andmore complex require more
talented and skilled executives. Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that the level and
structure of pay for banking executives match the competitiveness of the banking
environment. Economic theories therefore suggest a positive relation between firm
performance and executive pay measured relative to others in the industry.
Executive pay is thus affected by the availability of executive talent. A limited
supply can lead to higher pay and performance. By contrast, if executive entrench-
ment is caused simply by upward pressure on executive compensation, the relation-
ship between executive pay and performance can be negative if higher pay is not for
higher talent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Core et al., 1999; Faleye, 2007).
This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Higher executive pay relative to others in the industry is positively related to
firm performance when executive talent is scarce.
9 Greater ability can be intrinsic, or arise because of an executive’s social network and connections. This
is especially relevant in China because connections to the Communist Party can facilitate growth op-
portunities and reduce bureaucratic red tape.
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Employee Talent and Wage Premium
The relation between employee pay and firm performance is similar. Efficiency wage
theory predicts that remunerating employees with above-average wages relative to
peers may increase employee morale, reduce turnover (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984),
and deliver gains in productivity and profitability that exceed the incremental wage
cost (Lazear, 1979; Malcolmson, 1981; Akerlof, 1982; Raff and Summers, 1987). This
leads to higher financial performance if the higher productivity more than offsets the
higher wages. A widely cited application of efficiency wage theory is Henry Ford’s
introduction of the ‘five-dollar day’ in 1915.10 Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) find
empirical evidence consistent with efficiency wage theory: wage premiums are
associated with lower levels of shirking, and the effect is stronger in labour markets
with fewer alternative sources of employment. Banker et al. (2000) find increased
incentive pay to retail workers is associated with higher productivity. Therefore,
because pay gap is lower when employee wage premiums are higher, efficiency wage
theory suggests a negative relation between firm performance and pay gap.
The basic tenet is that efficiency wage theory, however, only applies when the
marginal product of labour is high (Katz, 1986). If employees are responsible for
relatively low value-added, routine tasks, firms have limited opportunities to obtain
efficient gains by attracting talented employees with high wage premiums. Routine
tasks are commonly performed by less skilled labour in abundant supply. For
instance, the World Bank (2009) report indicates the Chinese labour force is com-
prised of a large pool of homogenous unskilled labour with low marginal product
of employees. Koopman et al. (2008) find that the share of indigenous labour con-
tent in China’s exports is below 20% in relatively sophisticated sectors. Accordingly,
it is unlikely that the improved performance outcomes suggested by the efficiency
wage theory are applicable to Chinese firms that reward low-skilled labour with
above industry-average wages. In fact, paying wage premiums for such employees
is likely to reduce firm performance and value because of the negative return on
wage premiums. Therefore when employee wage premiums are higher but the
marginal product of employees is lower, a smaller firm pay gap results in lower
performance, implying a positive relation between firm performance and pay gap.
The discussion above leads to the following prediction based on economic theories:
H2: Higher employee pay relative to others in the industry is negatively related to
firm performance when labour supply is abundant.
The first two hypotheses based on economic theories together imply that the pay
gap is positively related to firm performance.
H3: In accord with economic theories, pay gap is positively related to performance
when executive talent is scarce and labour supply is abundant.
10 Raff and Summers (1987) find that Ford’s decision to substantially increase wages for most workers
resulted in significant improvements in productivity and profitability.
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Pay Gap and Sociological Theories
In contrast to predictions based on economic theories, sociological theories suggest
a large pay gap is likely to negatively affect employee morale, create envy, and lower
employee productivity and firm performance. For instance, equity theory states that
workers expect their rewards to match the level of their individual contribution
(Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974; Walster et al., 1978). Individuals evaluate fairness
by comparing the equity between their contributions and associated outcomes with
the contributions and outcomes of their reference groups. Dissimilar ratios lead to
perceptions of inequity, and individuals react by reducing their productivity or
demanding wage increases, resulting in reduced firm profitability (Cowherd and
Levine, 1992). Alternatively, individuals may choose to resign and the higher
employee turnover is likely to be more costly, especially for firms in industries with
a high marginal product of skilled labour because of the larger training and develop-
ment investment in employees. In sum, equity theory suggests firm pay gap is likely
to be negatively related to performance.
Relative deprivation theory argues that individuals experience deprivation if they
find they have been given less than they deserve when compared to rewards given to
their reference groups (Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Crosby, 1994; Martin, 1981).
Sociological studies of the pay gap appeal to relative deprivation theory because
the theory typically relates to upward comparisons made by lower status people.
Feelings of deprivation lead to behavioural reactions of frustration and lack of opti-
mism about the possibility of change. Crosby (1984) and Martin (1981, 1986) find
that externally directed behavioural responses include absenteeism, strikes, and
vandalism.11 Staw (1984) finds that product quality may also be affected. Akerlof
and Yellen (1986, 1990) find that if employee wages are lower than what they per-
ceive as fair, employees decrease their individual effort. Levine (1991) develops a
similar argument based on cohesiveness. In his model, firms have incentives to
reduce the pay gap to increase cohesiveness and employee productivity. In sum-
mary, relative deprivation theory also suggests that when pay gap is larger, em-
ployees feel less motivated to work, resulting in worse firm performance, implying
that consistent with predictions under equity theory, pay gap and performance are
negatively related.
Sociological theories of aspirational behaviour suggest that low-level employees
who observe a large pay gap may be motivated to work hard because they aspire
to be in those senior executive positions. This implies a positive association between
pay gap and performance. However, employees are unlikely to work harder when
they are homogenous and less skilled because they realize they do not possess the
technical or managerial skills required for senior-level jobs. Further, one form of
executive ‘talent’ that makes them more productive in countries like China is the
11 Numerous examples of Chinese workers undertaking strikes have been reported in the popular press.
These strikes are typically due to employee dissatisfaction with wage levels, and often to productivity
and production quota requirements imposed on workers. For example, see, ‘China Workers Strike at
Lingerie, IBM Parts Factories Demanding More Pay’ (Bloomberg.com, 24 November 2011); and ‘A
Dangerous Year’ (The Economist, 28 January 2012).
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tie that some executives have to the ruling party or local government officials (Yang
et al., 2009). The likely absence of political ties for low-level workers makes it
unlikely that employees with realistic aspirational beliefs expect that increases in
effort can ultimately result in significant increases in status and compensation. This
is well established in sociology as early as Lewin (1939), who finds workers calibrate
their aspirations with the prospects for attaining them. The discussion above of
sociological theories suggests the following alternative hypothesis:
H4: According to sociological theories, pay gap is negatively related to performance.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
We choose to evaluate these alternative arguments using a sample of firms domiciled
in China. The economic and social characteristics make China an interesting setting
because both economic and sociological theories can be applied. China provides a
setting where arguments that both support and refute both sociological and eco-
nomic theories hold, thus allowing empirical tests of the theoretical predictions.
Sample
We obtain financial statement, compensation, and return data for Chinese firms from
the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) financial database,
corporate governance database, and stock market databases respectively. The data
are publicly available from GTA Information Technology Company Limited.
CSMAR data are collected directly from public firms’ annual financial reports as
published in Securities Time, Shanghai Securities Daily, China Securities Daily, and
other major newspapers designated by CSRC. Double-checking has been performed
to ensure coding accuracy, and the CPI data are from the World Bank.12
Our sample period is the 10-year period from 2000 to 2009. We merge financial data
with corporate governance and stockmarket data and drop observations for which data
required to calculate Return on Assets, Margin, Growth, the pay gap variables, or the
control variables are missing. This generates a sample of 5,835 firm-year observations.
We allow firms to enter and exit our sample, resulting in an unbalanced panel.13
Empirical Models
Our empirical analysis seeks to examine the impact of gap between executive and
employee pay (Firm pay gap) on firm performance. We estimate the relation
between Firm pay gap in year t and Performance in year t + 1 using the following
primary empirical specification:
12 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
13 Our use of an unbalanced panel reduces the likelihood that our results are driven by a survivorship
bias. Untabulated tests show that our results are robust to restricting the sample to firms that are in
the database for the entire sample period. We lose over 50% of the primary sample when imposing
this condition.
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Performancei;tþ1 ¼ α þ β1Firm pay gapi;t þ gXi;t þ ei;t (1)
Where subscript i refers to the firm, and t refers to the year. Performancei,t+1 is set
to either: Return on Assets (ROA),Margin, orGrowth, all measured at t + 1. ROAt+1
is calculated as net income scaled by total assets (CSMAR # B002000000t+1 /
A001000000t+1). Margint+1 is net income scaled by total sales (CSMAR #
B002000000t+1 / B001101000t+1). Growtht+1 is the sum of asset growth and sales
growth from t to t + 1, and calculated as [(((CSMAR A001000000t+1 / A001000000
t) – 1) + ((B001101000t+1 / B001101000t)) – 1)].
14
Firm pay gapi,t is calculated as (Meanexecpayi,t / Meanemppayi,t). Meanexecpayi,t
is the sum of salary, bonus, and all other compensation for all executives in firm i
during year t divided by the total number of executives for the firm during year t,
and calculated as (CSMAR Y1501ai,t / (Y1101ai,t – Y1101bi,t + Y1201ai,
t + Y1301bi,t)).
15 In contrast to US firms, compensation in the form of stock and
stock options is rare in China and typically non-existent in SOEs (Mengistae and
Xu, 2004; Li et al. 2007). Prior to 2005, executives were prohibited from receiving
any stock-based compensation. In untabulated tests, we include stock-based com-
pensation in the calculation of total compensation. Results from these tests are
qualitatively similar to those presented in our main tables.
Mean employee expense is the sum of total salary expense net of executive
compensation scaled by total employees, net of executives and directors, measured
as [(CSMAR # ((A002112000i,t – A002112000i,t-1) + ((C001020000i,t – Y1501ai,t) /
(Y0601bi,t – Y1101ai,t + Y1201ai,t + Y1301bi,t – Y1101bi,t))].
In our model (1), Xit represents a vector of firm-specific control variables, includ-
ing book-to-market, firm size, stock return, and current period performance. Book-
to-market is calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of
equity, both calculated in year t and measured as (CSMAR # T61701). Firm size is
logged total assets in year t [log (CSMAR # A001000000)]. Stock return is the firm’s
stock return from t–1 to t less the value-weighted market return over the same
period.16 Lagged performance variables are the corresponding performance
variable for each of ROA, Margin or Growth measured at time t.
We also include two indicator variables to capture ownership characteristics
shown to affect Chinese firm performance. State ownership (SOE_Dummy) is set
14 Our results are robust to the use of industry-adjusted performance.
15 We acknowledge that a limitation of our study is reported executive compensation does not include
executive compensation such as entertainment, dining, cars, travel, drinks, and karaoke bars, or free
personal mobile phones (Adithipyangkul et al., 2011). Note that many of these are largely unobserv-
able to workers. To the extent that observable values of compensation exclude this form of compen-
sation, we do not fully capture the predictions from sociological theories about employee perceptions
of wage inequality. Further, while these are absent from reported compensation thus reducing the pay
gap, we do not expect this omission to have a systematic relation with firm performance.
16 Untabulated tests show that our results are robust to the use of equal-weighted market returns in-
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to one if the firm is classified as state owned or controlled, and zero otherwise. Qi
et al. (2005) find that performance is negatively related to state ownership. This is
because state-owned enterprises are less efficient and less incentivized to maximize
firm value relative to firms without state ownership influence (Firth et al., 2007;
Fan et al., 2007). Foreign_Dummy is an indicator variable set to one if the firm has
foreign ownership, and zero otherwise. We do not have an ex-ante prediction about
the relation between foreign ownership and performance. On one hand, foreign
investment is likely to occur in firms that have a large investment opportunity set
and can benefit from the foreign investor’s expertise and proprietary technology.
This suggests a positive relation between foreign investment and future perfor-
mance. Consistent with this, Wei et al. (2005) find a positive relation between foreign
investment in public Chinese firms and Tobin’s Q. In contrast, foreign investors may
be more likely to invest in larger, more stable Chinese firms with strong governance
and greater political clout. Such firms may have relatively smaller investment oppor-
tunity sets. This suggests a negative relation between the presence of foreign invest-
ment and future performance. Our model also includes year and industry fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). All raw
financial and compensation variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.17
Compensation variables are deflated to constant year values (the base year for the
index is 2000).
Our hypothesis based on economic theories of matching and efficiency wages
requires that we estimate how each of executive pay and employee pay (relative to
industry averages) affect performance. Accordingly, we decompose the Firm pay
gap into Executive pay premium, Employee pay premium, and Industry pay gap. This
decomposition allows us to identify firm-level pay premiums by comparing firm-level
pay relative to median industry-level pay. The Executive pay premium and Employee
pay premium are respectively measured as the mean executive or employee pay for a
firm relative to the median of correspondingmean values measured across all firms in
its industry. The Industry pay gap is the ratio of themedian average executive pay and
average employee pay. The decomposition can be formally written as follows:
Firm pay gapi;j;t ¼ Executive pay premiumi;j;t=Employee pay premiumi;j;t
Industry pay gapi;j;t
(2)
We calculateExecutive pay premiumi,j,t as [(Meanexecpayi,t / Med_meanexecpayj,t)],
where industry j corresponds to the primary industry classification for firm i in year t.
Meanexecpayi,t is as previously defined and Med_meanexecpayj,t is the median of
the industry mean executive compensation for industry j in year t. Employee pay
premiumi,j,t is calculated as the [(Meanemppayi,t/Med_meanexecpayj,t)].
Meanemppayi,t is as previously defined and Med_meanexecpayj,t is the median of
the industry mean employee expense for industry j in year t. Industry pay gapj,t is
17 Our results are qualitatively similar if we truncate variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
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calculated as [(Med_meanexecpayj,t / Med_meanemppayj,t)]. Our extended model is
now specified as18:
Performancei;tþ1 ¼ αþ β1Executive pay premiumi;j;t
þ β2Employee pay premiumi;j;t þ β3Industry pay gapj;t
þ gXi;t þ ei;t (3)
We hypothesize that the coefficient for Executive pay premium is positive as
motivated for Hypothesis 1 and the coefficient for Employee pay premium is nega-
tive as motivated for Hypothesis 2. The Industry pay gap captures the extent to
which the Firm pay gap is driven by structural pay gaps at the industry level. Pay
gap variation at the industry level can occur because of industry-specific demand
for executives with required skills or experience (for example, demand for execu-
tives with foreign language fluency, technical skills, or geographic experience) driv-
ing up compensation in some industries to attract scarce executive talent.
Alternatively, the Industry pay gap may be affected by differences at the industry
level in required employee skill levels. Industries that require more skilled labour
pay higher wages, mechanically reducing the Industry pay gap. As the Industry
pay gap is driven by a number of structural factors and is not central to our study,
we do not have a prior expectation for the direction of its coefficient.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Average Firm pay gap is 6.20
(median = 4.43) indicating that, on average, executive salaries are six times those
of non-executive employees. Pay premiums are much smaller. Average Executive
pay premium is 1.39 (median = 1.02 and standard deviation = 1.29) while average
employee pay premium is 1.61 (median = 1.00; standard deviation = 2.86) indicating
a skewed distribution at the industry level. The relatively large standard deviation
for Employee pay premium reflects regional differences in the cost of labour. Brandt
and Holz (2006) find the cost of living in Chinese urban areas is 39% higher than the
cost of living in rural areas. Further, a 2005 US Bureau of Labor Statistics study
finds that employees of Chinese manufacturing firms located in urban areas earn
US$1.06 per hour whereas similar workers in suburban and rural areas earn an
average of US$0.45 per hour (Banister, 2005).
Industry pay gap has a mean value of 4.56 (median = 4.48; standard devia-
tion = 1.04). The median Firm pay gap and Industry pay gap are almost the same,
indicating that a large portion of Firm pay gap is determined by industry-level fac-
tors. This is a useful insight from the decomposition analysis that identifies the effect
of Executive pay premium and Employee pay premium separately from the Industry
pay gap.
18 We report results based on the additive model. The results are robust if the log transforms are used.
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Firm size measured by average sales and total assets exhibits considerable varia-
tion in our sample. We use the average in keeping with prior literature due to the
high correlation between sales growth and asset growth. The results are similar
when either growth measure is used. Due to collinearity, the relative importance
of the two measures cannot be reliably separated. Average book-to-market is 0.05,
which suggests Chinese firms have large investment opportunity sets. The mean
and median market adjusted returns for year t are both negative (mean = –1%;
median =6%) but subject to significant variation (standard deviation = 62%).
Two of our measures of performance, mean ROAt and Margint, are relatively small,
3% and 2% respectively. Further, Growtht, which captures both asset and sales
growth is 30% on average, consistent with the high growth rate in industrial activity
in China in the last decade. Taken together, our ROA, margin, and growth results
suggest that the value of Chinese firms is driven by sales and asset growth activity,
rather than increases in operating efficiencies. This is intuitive: growth and expan-
sion opportunities attract new firms to an industry, increasing competition, which
subsequently decreases margins and ROA.
Consistent with China’s strengths in manufacturing, the primary industry classifi-
cation for approximately two-thirds of our sample is from manufacturing industries
(untabulated). We also identify the province that firms report as their primary place
of business. Nearly 55% of the firms in our sample are from provinces that have
coastal access along China’s eastern seaboard. Coastal provinces include major
Eastern metropolitan areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong that have
been subject to greater increases in wages and cost of living relative to many inland
provinces.19 In the tests below, we consider the possibility that our results are
affected by differences in coastal and inland province labour costs.
19 A recent article (‘The end of cheap China’) notes that coastal labour costs have risen by 20% a year
for the past four years. (The Economist, 10 March 2012).
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Firm pay gap 5835 6.20 4.43 5.86
Executive pay premium 5835 1.39 1.02 1.29
Employee pay premium 5835 1.61 1.00 2.86
Industry pay gap 5835 4.56 4.48 1.04
Sales ($m RMB) 5835 2720 1010 5814
Total assets ($m RMB) 5835 3646 1656 8323
Book-to-market 5835 0.05 0.03 0.07
Adjusted returns 5835 1% 6% 62%
ROAt 5835 3% 3% 5%
Margint 5835 2% 5% 35%
Growtht 5835 30% 28% 21%
Descriptive statistics for sample firms. All financial values are reported in Chinese Renminbi (millions).
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 2 reports Spearman and Pearson correlations for pay gap and performance
variables. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. Firm
pay gap is positively associated with Executive pay premium and Industry pay gap
and negatively associated withEmployee pay premium by construction as in equation
(2). The relation between Firm pay gap and each of the three measures of perfor-
mance is positive, contrary to arguments in sociology that suggest a larger Firm pay
gap will reduce performance. Further, each pay gap measure is positively correlated
with performance, but with relatively small correlations, ranging from 0.29 (Executive
pay premium and ROAt+1) to 0.03 (Employee pay premium and ROAt+1).
20 The only
exception is the negative correlation between the Industry pay gap and Growtht+1
0.017. Overall, these positive correlations are consistent with the economic
theories of matching rather than with sociological theories of deprivation.
Main Results
Table 3 presents results for empirical tests of the relation between Firm pay gap and
performance. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results where the dependent variable is
one-period ahead ROAt+1,Margint+1, andGrowtht+1 respectively. We find a positive
and significant relation between Firm pay gap and all three performance measures,
consistent with economic theories. Further, the coefficient for Firm pay gap is statis-








































































































Table 2 displays correlations for key variables. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the
diagonal. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.
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for the performance measure ROAt+1, the coefficient for Firm pay gap is 0.04 and
the t-statistic is 3.27. Results for tests using Margint+1 in column 2 and Growtht+1
in column 3 report similar results (Firm pay gap coefficient = 0.14; t-stat = 2.91 for
Margint+1 and coefficient = 0.22; t-stat = 2.69 for Growtht+1). The results are consis-
tent with theories of managerial talent because growth opportunities in China are
likely to be related to executive talent rather than employee talent.
Book-to-markett (BtM) is positively related to ROAt+1 (coefficient = 5.05,
t-statistic = 3.62), and negatively associated with Margint+1 and Growtht+1 (Margint+1
coefficient = –15.12, t-statistic = –3.17; and Growtht+1 coefficient = –57.14,
t-statistic = –6.30). Lagged returns are positively related to all performance measures,
consistent with market participants impounding good news information into stock
prices prior to information being reflected in accounting numbers. State ownership
is negatively associated with all performance measures, consistent with state-owned
firms being less efficient than non-state-owned firms.21 Foreign investment is nega-
tively related to performance for all performance measures but statistically significant
only forGrowtht+1 (coefficient = –7.18, t-statistic = –2.66). We also include controls for
performance measured contemporaneously with Firm pay gap, and find that ROAt is
positively and significantly related to ROAt+1, but both Margint and Growtht are
21 In sensitivity tests, we consider whether central or local government state ownership affect firm per-
formance. Our results are qualitatively similar when we split the sample by central and local govern-





Firm pay gapt 0.04*** (3.269) 0.14*** (2.914) 0.22*** (2.686)
Book-to-markett 5.05*** (3.618) –15.12*** (–3.172) –57.14*** (–6.298)
Firm sizet –0.13* (–1.820) 0.06 (0.187) 0.63 (0.833)
Adjusted returnst–1, t 0.47*** (4.744) 1.37*** (4.375) 7.00*** (5.842)
SOE_Dummyt –0.62*** (–4.169) –2.29*** (–3.816) –0.78 (–0.559)




Constant 5.39*** (3.482) 7.21 (1.027) 108.66*** (6.369)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Province fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 5,835 5,835 5,835
R-squared 0.29 0.06 0.05
Table 3 reports results from tests of the relation between firm performance and firm pay gap during the
period 2000–2009 for Chinese firms. All regressions include standard errors clustered by firm and year
and include year and industry fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
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negatively and insignificantly related to Margint+1 and Growtht+1 respectively. Our
overall findings in Table 3 do not support sociological theories that predict larger
pay gaps have an adverse effect on firm performance because of decreased employee
morale (Hypothesis 3a but not Hypothesis 3b).
In Table 4, we present results of the estimation of the relation between the Firm
pay gap components and performance. Coefficients for Executive pay premium
using all three measures of performance are positive and statistically significant at
conventional levels (for ROAt+1 coefficient = 0.50, t-statistic = 7.36; for Margint+1
coefficient = 1.65, t-statistic = 7.67; forGrowtht+1 coefficient = 1.81, t-statistic = 4.67).
This finding supports economic theories of managerial talent and matching
(Hypothesis 3a but not Hypothesis 3b). Talented executives receive relatively higher
pay, and in turn respond by using their talents to improve the firm’s performance.
These empirical results reveal an economically significant relationship between
profit and paying premium wages to talented executives. On average, a one
standard deviation increase in Executive pay premium corresponds to an increase
in ROAt+1 from 3.0% to 3.7%, and an increase in Margint+1 from 2.0% to 4.1%.
Because growth in firm size in China is usually driven by political and economic
planning rather than managerial talent, the impact on Growtht+1 is more modest.
On average, a one standard deviation increase in Executive pay premium
corresponds to an increase in Growtht+1 from 30.0% to only 32.3%.
TABLE 4
PAY GAP DECOMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE
(1) (2) (3)
ROAt+1 Margint+1 Growtht+1
Executive pay premiumt 0.50*** (7.357) 1.65*** (7.666) 1.81*** (4.668)
Employee pay premiumt 0.03 (0.883) 0.24 (1.267) –0.21 (–1.369)
Industry pay gapt 0.23*** (2.690) 0.53* (1.691) 0.04 (0.049)
Book-to-markett 4.59*** (3.431) –15.53*** (–3.159) –56.03*** (–6.057)
Firm sizet –0.32*** (–4.203) –0.61* (–1.868) 0.11 (0.144)
Adjusted returnst–1, t 0.47*** (4.806) 1.29*** (4.224) 7.02*** (5.834)
SOE_Dummyt –0.60*** (–4.108) –2.19*** (–3.791) –0.87 (–0.627)




Constant 7.88*** (4.978) 16.89** (2.460) 118.14*** (6.889)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 5,835 5,835 5,835
R-squared 0.30 0.08 0.05
Table 4 reports results from tests of the relation between firm performance and the executive pay
premium, the employee pay premium, and the industry pay gap during the period 2000–2009. All
regressions include standard errors clustered by firm and year and include year and industry fixed effects.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
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Coefficients on Employee pay premium are positive but statistically insignificant
for all measures of performance indicating that firms that compensate workers with
above market wages do not realize commensurate increased productivity and
returns expected under efficiency wage theory. This finding is expected given
China’s large homogenous low-skilled labour pool and its focus on low-value add
manufacturing. The Industry pay gap is positive and significant for both ROAt+1
and Margint+1 suggesting pay differences at the industry level affect performance.
For instance, some industries that have potential for greater growth and operating
efficiency may provide wage premiums to attract talented executives.
Similar to our findings reported in Table 3, Book-to-markett is positively and sig-
nificantly associated with ROAt+1 but negatively with Margint+1 and Growtht+1.
Firm size is negatively associated with ROAt+1 andMargint+1, consistent with expec-
tations. State ownership is negatively associated with all three measures of perfor-
mance, but statistically significant only for Growtht+1. All specifications include
year and industry fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered.
In summary, our cumulative results in Tables 3 and 4 provide little support for
sociological arguments about adverse performance effects of Firm pay gap, and ac-
tually suggest that larger pay gap is associated with higher performance. To better
understand this result, we decompose Firm pay gap and examine how the executive
and employee pay premiums and industry pay gap affect performance. Consistent
with economic theory, we find that the relation between pay gap and performance
is driven by compensation premiums for talented executives rather than wage
premiums for employees.
We perform a number of sensitivity tests. First, we find our results above are qual-
itatively similar (untabulated) when we use CEO pay or non-CEO top executive
pay to calculate Meanexecpay rather than the average pay for top executives. This
suggests that wage premiums for executive talent is not driven by premiums just
for CEOs but rather, for all members of the executive team. Second, we replicate
our tests for a sub-sample using observations from the period from 2005 to 2010
for which we can obtain (i) dual CEO-Chairman and CEO power data, and (ii)
CEO political connections to the ruling party data. In untabulated tests, we find that
our results are qualitatively similar after partitioning firms into high and low CEO
power and high and low political connection groups.
Third, we replicate our tests after partitioning firms into non-SOE and SOE
groups. We find that for non-SOE firms, Firm pay gap is positive and significant
in regressions where the dependent variable is set to either ROA or Margin (but
not for tests where the dependent variable is Growth). In contrast, tests for the
SOE group indicate that Firm pay gap is positively and significantly related to
Growth, but not the other performance measures. This finding is consistent with
the differences in the objective function for SOE and non-SOE firms, and thus their
demand for executive skills and talents. The Chinese government seeks to have
greater recognition in the world of business and has been encouraging rapid growth
for many of its SOEs. By contrast, private firms seek to be more profitable. This is
also consistent with a report by the Chinese State-Owned Assets Supervisor and
Administration Commission (SASAC, 2004), which states that SOE managers
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should be highly incentivized to focus on increasing scale rather than profitability—
about 50% of executive salary is typically linked to growth targets, 10% to profit-
ability targets, and 40% to firm-specific characteristics such as operating complexity.
Panel A of Table 5 presents regressions of performance on pay gap and Panel B
presents results regressing performance on components of pay gap with firms
partitioned into manufacturing and other (non-manufacturing) industry groups. To
the extent that the use of unskilled Chinese labour is concentrated in manufacturing
industries, the predominance of manufacturing firms in our sample could be driving
our results. First, Panel A reports results from regressions of the relation between
the Firm pay gap and performance. Columns 1 and 2 report results using ROAt+1,
3 and 4 using Margint+1, and 5 and 6 using Growtht+1 to measure performance.
The first column for each performance measure displays results for tests using
manufacturing firms and the second for non-manufacturing firms. Results for both
groups of firms indicate that the Firm pay gap is positive for all specifications and
statistically significant at conventional levels for ROAt+1 in both partitions
(manufacturing firms coefficient = 0.03, t-statistic = 2.28; other firms coeffi-
cient = 0.05, t-statistic = 2.43) and for Margint+1 for the manufacturing firm partition
(coefficient = 0.14, t-statistic = 2.61). Results for control variables are consistent with
earlier findings reported in Table 3 for the full sample.
Panel B of Table 5 reports results of tests of the relation between pay gap compo-
nents and firm performance. Coefficients for Executive pay premium remain positive
and statistically significant for all sub-sample specifications, indicating that the posi-
tive effect of executive talent for firm performance is not driven by manufacturing or
other industry groupings. Next, we observe a positive relation between manufactur-
ing firms and ROAt+1 and Margint+1 for Employee pay premium, but a negative
relation for non-manufacturing firms, consistent with our expectations. In both sub-
samples, coefficients for Growtht+1 are negative, and all but one of the coefficients
for all measures of performance are statistically insignificant. Overall, these results
also indicate that the main driver of performance is executive talent. Coefficients
for control variables are largely consistent with earlier results. Book-to-market is
positively related toROAt+1 and negatively related toMargint+1. Both SOE_Dummy
and Foreign_Dummy are negatively related to all measures of performance for both
partitions (with the exception of SOE_Dummy and Growtht+1 for the non-
manufacturing sub-sample where the coefficient is positive and significant at 10%).
The next set of results in Table 6 considers whether differences in labour costs
across coastal and inland provinces affect the pay gap and performance relation doc-
umented above. Coastal provinces have experienced relatively greater blue-collar
wage increase demands and inflationary pressure over the sample period compared
to inland provinces.22 Greater wage increases in coastal regions could mechanically
22 A recent article in The Economist notes: ‘Labour costs have surged by 20% a year for the past four
years … China’s coastal provinces are losing their power to suck workers out of the hinterland’
and ‘Labour costs (including benefits) for blue-collar workers in Guangdong rose by 12% a year, in
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reduce the Firm pay gap. Alternatively, workers enjoying large wage increases may
exhibit greater morale and productivity. Panels A and B present regressions of per-
formance on pay gap and its components respectively, with firms being partitioned
by coastal or inland location. Results in Panel A for Firm pay gap show a consistent
positive relation between pay gap and performance for all sub-samples and signifi-
cant at the 5% level for all inland sub-samples. This result is again inconsistent with
predictions from sociology, and may be better understood by examining the compo-
nents of pay gap.
In Panel B we examine how each of the Firm pay gap components affects perfor-
mance for the coastal and inland firm sub-samples. The results once again indicate
that the Executive pay premium is the dominant driver of the relation between
pay gap and performance. All coefficients are positive and significant at the 1%
level in five of the six specifications. We find no evidence that a larger Employee
pay premium increases firm performance, and in fact, a larger Employee pay pre-
mium for coastal firms seems to be linked to lower Growtht+1 (Column 6; coeffi-
cient = –0.55, t-statistic = –2.02). In sum, the evidence in Table 6 indicates that
location-level wage differences do not affect our main results and, in fact, provide
further evidence that the performance and pay gap relation is driven by wage pre-
miums for executive talent.
Alternative Empirical Approach to Examine the Pay Gap and Performance Relation
We consider an alternative empirical approach to validate our primary tests. Some
evidence in prior sociology studies suggests that perceptions of pay gap inequality
are affected by deviations from expected pay gap rather than the actual pay gap
(Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Baron and Pfeffer, 1994; Bloom, 1999). These studies
argue that low-level employees rationally expect to observe differences between
their own wages and those of executives, and thus perceptions of fairness and equal-
ity are based on deviations from the expected pay gap. Positive deviations result in a
greater perception of inequality and are associated with reduced productivity and
employee morale suggesting a negative relation between larger-than-expected devi-
ations from pay gap and performance. In contrast, managerial talent and matching
theory from economics suggest that positive deviations from expected pay represent
wage premiums for talented managers, suggesting a positive relation between
larger-than-expected deviations from pay gap and performance.
In order to calculate deviations from expected pay gap, we first need estimates of
the expected pay gap. We obtain estimates of pay gap by regressing Firm pay gap on
its determinants using the following specification:
Firm pay gapi;tþ1 ¼ αþ β Xi;t þ ei;t (4)
where X includes variables to capture the firm’s investment opportunity set, mea-
sured using Book-to-market, Firm size, Adjusted returns, ROA, and indicator vari-
ables for the presence of state and foreign ownership (SOE_Dummy and
Foreign_Dummy respectively), as well as year and industry fixed effects. Estimation
results for equation (4) are presented in Table 7, Column 1. Consistent with
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expectations, Book-to-market, Firm size and ROA are all positively and significantly
associated with Firm pay gap. SOE_Control is negatively associated with Firm pay
gap, consistent with government objectives to limit pay gaps. Foreign_Dummy is
positively but insignificantly associated with Firm pay gap. The adjusted R-square
from the regression is 0.41 suggesting our model explains pay gap reasonably well.
Next, we use the results from equation (4) to calculate firm-year expected pay gap
estimates. The residual pay gap is then calculated as the actual Firm pay gap less the
expected Firm pay gap. We follow prior work (e.g., Ittner et al., 2003; Rajagopal and
Srinivasan, 2006; Wade et al., 2006) and create variables to capture the absolute level
of deviation (Pay Gap Deviation) as well as separate variables for positive deviation
(Pos Pay Gap Deviation) and negative deviation (Neg Pay Gap Deviation). We then
estimate the following specifications:
Performancei;tþ1 ¼ αþ βPay Gap Deviationi;t þ gXi;t þ ei;t (5)
and:
Performancei;tþ1 ¼ αþ β1Pos Pay Gap Deviationi;t
þ β2Neg Pay Gap Deviationi;t þ gXi;t þ ei;t (6)
Table 7, Columns 2 to 7 present empirical results for tests of equations (5) and (6)
for Performance measured as one of one-period ahead ROAt+1, Margint+1, and
Growtht+1 respectively. Evidence in Columns 2, 3, and 4 presents results estimating
equation (4). We find Pay Gap Deviation is positively and significantly associated
with all three performance measures, consistent with economic theories that suggest
a positive relation between pay gap deviation and performance. Next, in Columns 5,
6, and 7, we present results estimating equation (6) where we decompose Pay Gap
Deviation into Pos Pay Gap Deviation and Neg Pay Gap Deviation. The results are
again consistent with economic theories of managerial talent and matching: Pos Pay
Gap Deviation is positively and significantly associated with ROA, Margin, and
Growth suggesting greater than expected pay gaps are associated with better future
performance. In contrast, Neg Pay Gap Deviation displays no significant relation to
any of the performance measures. Firms with pay gaps smaller than expected do not
appear to be paying premiums to hire the most talented executives. In sum, the ev-
idence in Table 7 is consistent with our primary findings, and provides support for
economic theories of executive talent and matching.23
Robustness Check with Controls for Corporate Governance Attributes
A large body of work shows that a firm’s corporate governance attributes affect firm
performance (Core et al., 1999). We replicate our tests for a sub-sample of firms for
23 In additional sensitivity tests, we check that our results hold when using a 2SLS approach. In the first
stage, we instrument for pay gap using two-period lagged values of pay gap. Untabulated regression
results indicate that our main results are robust to this alternate specification to address potential
endogenity concerns.
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which we can obtain firm-specific corporate governance and detailed leverage
data.24 Consistent with prior work, we expect a positive relation between firm perfor-
mance and corporate governance quality. Our corporate governance controls capture
the total number of executives on the board (Number of Executives), the average
executive age (Executive Age), the proportion of non-executive directors on the
board (Board Independence), and the number of times the board met during the cal-
endar year (Board Meetings). We also include a control for firm leverage (Leverage).
To save space, we do not present the detailed regression results in our paper.
Additional Results for a Sample of US Firms
While our use of a sample of Chinese firms for the primary tests provides a setting
that is conducive to sociological theories of equity and distributive justice, we repli-
cate our tests using a sample of US firms to validate the robustness of our findings.
The capitalist history and culture in the US setting provides possibly weaker support
for the predicates of sociological theories. This is consistent with anecdotal
evidence: New York Times and Business Week articles suggest that relative well-
being has been relatively unimportant for American workers over the past decade:
employees appear to expect and accept wage cuts and reduced benefits while
observing increases in executive compensation.25 Further, the market for executive
talent is better developed in the US than in China, which allows firms to more easily
identify and reward talented managers. A recent report (AON, 2008) notes that
nearly 60% of US firms face a shortage of skilled executives. We therefore expect
a positive relation between pay gap and performance, and expect that the relation
be driven by premiums paid for executive talent rather than for skilled labour.26
A limitation with the US firm data is that employee wage expense and employee
count disclosures are not mandated, significantly reducing the sample size and
potentially introducing a sample selection bias. We create our sample by merging
data from Compustat, C/R/S/P, and Execucomp. After deleting observations missing
financial accounting, stock return, executive pay, or employee pay data, our dataset
consists of 3,747 firm-year observations, of which approximately 50% represent
financial services firms. Accordingly, our tests for US firms are partitioned into
financial and non-financial firms. The sample period is identical to that used for
our main tests: from 2000 to 2009.
24 We do not include these variables in our primary tests because of the substantial decrease in the num-
ber of observations: we can obtain corporate governance data and leverage data for only about 65%
of our full sample (i.e., 3,785 observations).
25 For example, see Greenhouse (2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/business/economy/
04paycuts.html; and Herbst (2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2009/
db20090710_255918.htm
26 We note that compensation disclosures for the top five highest paid executives in industries such as
Financial Services often include non-C-level executives. We assume that the top five highest paid ex-
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Panel A in Table 9 presents regressions of firm performance on pay gap, with par-
titions into Financial Services and Non-financial Services sub-samples. The relation
between Firm pay gap and performance is positive for all performance measures
and significant for ROAt+1 and Growtht+1 in the Financial Services partition
(ROAt+1 coefficient = 0.39, t-stat = 1.768; Growtht+1 coefficient = 0.09, t-stat = 2.24).
Results from tests for the Non-financial Services partition display similar results for
all performance measures. Coefficients forMargint+1 andGrowtht+1 are positive and
significant (Margint+1 coefficient = 0.95, t-stat = 2.31; Growtht+1 coefficient = 0.09,
t-stat = 3.10). Coefficients for Firm sizet and Book-to-markett are negative for all
performance measures across both partitions, consistent with smaller firms being
more profitable and enjoying more growth opportunities than larger firms. The
coefficient for Adjusted returnst–1,t is positive for all tests, consistent with market
participants impounding good news into prices before that information is reflected
in accounting reports. In sum, the results do not provide support for sociological
theories that predict a negative relation between pay gap and performance.
Our results for US firms are largely consistent with results for our primary
Chinese sample. Firm pay gap is positively related to performance, and this effect
appears to be primarily driven by compensation premiums for executive talent.
CONCLUSION
We investigate an issue that has received much recent attention in the media and has
been the subject of political scrutiny leading to new reporting requirements under
the Dodd–Frank Act. Popular press articles argue the pay gap between executives
and employees in a firm is excessive, resulting in a detrimental effect on a firm’s per-
formance. We specifically focus on the relation between the pay gap and firm perfor-
mance and test competing theories about executive and employee pay that can
explain the pay gap–performance relation. On one hand, the pay gap may be higher
due to wage premiums for talented executives who can generate relatively better
firm performance, consistent with economic theories of matching (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000) and managerial talent (Rosen, 1982). Alterna-
tively, the pay gap may be lower due to wage premiums for skilled human capital
at lower levels of the organization, consistent with efficiency wage theory (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981; Raff and Summers, 1987), in which case the pay gap is negatively
related to performance. If higher wages are unrelated to employee skills and ability,
it would imply that employees are overpaid and the pay gap–performance relation
would be the opposite. On balance, economic theories predict a positive relation
between pay gap and performance when executive talent is scarce and employee
labour is abundant. In contrast, sociological theories of equity and relative depriva-
tion suggest that larger pay gaps lead to decreased levels of employee morale and
motivation, reducing productivity and firm performance.
In this paper, we test the contrasting theories that explain the pay gap–
performance relation using a sample of Chinese firms. China’s socialist background
and the cultural importance placed on social equity provides us with a setting that is
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likely to provide strong support for the theoretical arguments in sociology underly-
ing social equity and fairness that predict a negative relation between pay gap and
performance. At the same time, the high growth opportunities in China also create
a strong demand for scarce executive talent, supporting the assumptions of the
economic theories that predict a positive relation.
Our empirical results provide strong evidence that the wage premiums for
talented executives, rather than for employees, drive the pay gap–performance
relation. This result is surprising given China’s social and political climate demands
a smaller pay gap but is consistent with China’s rapid commercial and economic
growth that creates a scarcity of executive talent. We find no evidence that wage
premiums for employees (which reduces the pay gap) improves performance for
firms in China. In additional robustness tests, we consider whether industry- or
province-level effects could drive our results and find that our principal results hold
for all sub-samples of manufacturing or other firms and coastal or interior Chinese
locations. We also find our results are robust to the use of an alternative approach
to examine the performance and pay gap relation, which relies on the estimation
of deviations from expected pay gap values, as well as the inclusion of governance
quality variables for a sub-sample of firms with available data. Finally, we replicate
our main tests using a sample of US firms for which we can obtain employee pay
data. We find evidence once again in support of economics-based arguments that ex-
plain the positive relation between pay gap and performance relation.
Our study is one of the first to provide empirical evidence on how pay gap posi-
tively affects performance, and how economic theory can explain the positive rela-
tion between pay gap and performance. Our findings suggest that media and
business press reports about the adverse effects of pay gap are unfounded, and from
an economic efficiency viewpoint, economic theories are validated by empirical
tests. We note, however, that researchers need to carefully consider the impact of
both cultural and economic factors and the implications of these factors in the choice
of research setting, theoretical predictions, and design of empirical tests.
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Firm pay gapt Calculated as (Meanexecpay / Meanemppay) where Meanexecpay is the
sum of salary, bonus, and all other compensation for all executives in
firm i during year t divided by the total number of executives for the firm
during year t, and calculated as (CSMAR Y1501ai,t / (Y1101ai,t – Y1101bi,t
+ Y1201ai,t + Y1301bi,t)). Mean employee expense is the sum of total
salary expense net of executive compensation scaled by total employees,
net of executives and directors, measured as [(CSMAR # ((A002112000i,t
– A002112000i,t–1) + ((C001020000i,t – Y1501ai,t) / (Y0601bi,t – Y1101ai,t
+ Y1201ai,t + Y1301bi,t – Y1101bi,t))].
Executive pay premiumt Calculated as Meanexecpay for a firm relative to the median of
corresponding mean values of Meanexecpay measured across all firms in
its industry.
Employee pay premiumt Calculated as Meanemppay for a firm relative to the median of
corresponding mean values of Meanemppay measured across all firms in
its industry.
Industry pay gapt Calculated as the ratio of the industry median Meanexecpay and industry
median Meanemppay.
Total assetst ($m RMB) (CSMAR # A001000000).
Book-to-markett Calculated as book value of equity divided by the market value of equity,
both calculated in year t and measured as (CSMAR # T61701).
Annual returnt–1, t Calculated as a firm’s stock return from t–1 to t less the value-weighted
market return over the same period.
SOE_Dummyt An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is classified as state-owned or
controlled and 0 otherwise.
Foreign_Dummyt An indicator variable set to one if the firm has foreign ownership, and
zero otherwise.
ROAt Calculated as net income scaled by total assets (CSMAR # B002000000
/ A001000000).
Margint Calculated as net income scaled by total sales (CSMAR # B002000000
/ B001101000).
Growtht Calculated as the sum of asset growth and sales growth from t to t + 1,
and calculated as [(((CSMAR A001000000 / A001000000) – 1)
+ ((B001101000 / B001101000)) – 1)].
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